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BACK TO THE GAME: HOW CONGRESS CAN
HELP SPORTS LEAGUES SHIFT THE FOCUS
FROM STEROIDS TO SPORTS
Joseph M. Saka'
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 2005, Major League Baseball (MLB) and the
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) announced a
new drug testing agreement that averted the passage of pending
Congressional legislation.2  The agreement increased penalties,
initiated more frequent testing, and added amphetamines to the
banned substance list.3 The agreement has been seen as a meaningful
step in curbing the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional
baseball.4 Many experts including congressional representatives, sports
journalists, and MLB and MLBPA personnel cited Congressional
intervention as an impetus for the agreement.5
1. J.D. Candidate, 2007, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law (Washington, DC); B.A. International Affairs, 2001, The George Washington
University (Washington, DC). A special thanks to Jamie Attanasio, Roger
Hartley, Terry Madden, Kenneth Nahigian, Leah Lerman, and the entire Health
Law Journal staff.
2. Jack Curry, Baseball Backs Stiffer Penalties for Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2005, at Al; MLB, MLBPA Announce new Drug Agreement,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/ pa/releases/ releases.jsp ?content=11 1505#summary.
The agreement became effective for the 2006 season, and was to expire in 2008.
Barry M. Bloom, Players Approve New Steroid Agreement, Dec. 6, 2005,
http://mlb.mlb.com/ news/ article.jsp? ymd=20051208& contentid= 1279825&
vkey= newsmlb&fext=.jsp&cid=mlb. The drug agreement, however, has since
been extended as part of Baseball's new Collective Bargaining Agreement, which
does not expire until 2011. Barry M. Bloom, Union Announce New Labor Deal,
Oct. 25, 2006, http:/ mlb.mlb.com/ news/ article.jsp? ymd=20061024 &contentid=
1722211& vkey=news.mlb &fext=.jsp&cjid=mlb.
3. Curry, supra note 2; MLB, MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement,
supra note 2.
4. Curry, supra note 2.
5. Id.; HOWARD BRYANT, JUICING THE GAME 331-32 (Viking 2005). Indeed,
Donald Fehr acknowledged that Congressional pressure was a reason MLBPA's
adoption of the drug agreement. Tim Dahlberg, Major League Players Approve
New Steroid Agreement, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/ sports/ baseball/ 2005-12-08-steroids-union x.htm.
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Prior to the agreement, the use of performance-enhancing drugs in
professional sports had received substantial notoriety. Indeed, in the
2004 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush discussed
steroid use in professional sports alongside some of the most important
issues affecting Americans today.' A number of recent events had
highlighted the problem of steroid use in the United States.
One of the most significant of these events that eventually triggered
Congressional intervention was the discovery of tetrahydrogestrinone
(THG), a virtually undetectable designer steroid! THG first made
news after a syringe containing THG, and purported to be
manufactured by Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO), was
anonymously delivered to the United States Anti-Doping Agency
(USADA).8 On September 3, 2003, federal and local agents raided
BALCO's San Francisco offices and found that BALCO had been
distributing THG.9  Coverage of this story increased when Greg
6. Bryant, supra note 5, at 310; Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 94, 100 (Jan.
20, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-
7.html. President Bush stated:
Athletics play such an important role in our society, but, unfortunately,
some in professional sports are not setting much of an example. The use
of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and
other sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message-that there are
shortcuts to accomplishment, and that performance is more important
than character. So tonight I call on team owners, union representatives,
coaches, and players to take the lead, to send the right signal, to get tough,
and to get rid of steroids now.
Id.
7. See Steroid Use in Professional and Amateur Sports: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter
Hearing on Steroid Use] (statement of Sen. John McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation), http://commerce.senate.gov/ hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=1100&witid=2191. Congress had previously focused on
steroids briefly after former MLB player and onetime MVP Ken Caminiti
admitted to using steroids and claimed that many players were doing the same.
See Bryant, supra note 5, at 192-95, 260; cf Tom Verducci, Totally Juiced, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 34, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2004/ magazine/03/02/ flashback-juiced/ index.html (discussing Caminiti's steroid
use).
8. Adrian Wilairat, Faster, Higher, Stronger? Federal Efforts to Criminalize
Anabolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 377, 385
(2005); Bryant, supra note 5, at 309.
9. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 385; Bryant, supra note 5, at 303.
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Anderson, the personal trainer of a number of athletes, including
Barry Bonds, was implicated as being part of a conspiracy to distribute
anabolic steroids. 0 Barry Bonds, the seven-time National League
Most Valuable Player, had broken the single-season home run record
just two years earlier, hitting 73 homeruns in a single season." Bonds
testified in the grand jury investigation of BALCO alongside perennial
MLB All-stars Jason Giambi and Gary Sheffield. 2 The San Francisco
Chronicle later published portions of both Bonds' and Giambi's
testimony in the BALCO steroids case where they admitted using
THG.13
In light of this scandal, the United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Technology, chaired by Senator John
McCain, began holding hearings in October 2003 on performance-
enhancing drugs. 4 In order to rectify the problem, Congress proposed
a number of bills that would directly regulate performance-enhancing
drugs in professional sports by setting standards and penalties for the
leagues. 5 These bills were postponed after MLB and the MLBPA
16came to a new drug-testing agreement. Although the new agreement
withholds this legislation's passage, 7  renewed Congressional
intervention is always possible.
10. John T. Wendt, The Year of the Steroid: Are New Testing Regimes
Enough?, ENT. & SPORTS. LAW. (ABA/Forum on the Entm't and Sports Indus.,
Chicago, Ill.), Winter 2005, at 8. Anderson was sentenced to jail time on October
18, 2005 "after pleading guilty to money laundering and a steroid distribution
charge." Three Sentenced in Balco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at D4.
11. Rafael Hermoso, With Testimony Looming, Bonds Wins Sixth M.V.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at DI.
12. Giambis and Sheffield Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at D4.
13. Bryant, supra note 5, at 313-17; Mark Fainaru-Wade & Lance Williams,
Giambi Admitted Taking Steroids, S.F CHRON., Dec. 2, 2004, at Al; Mark Fainaru-
Wade & Lance Williams, What Bonds Told BALCO Grand Jury, S.F CHRON.,
Dec. 3, 2004, at Al. Bonds claimed his use of THG was accidental. Id. For a good
overview of the entire BALCO case see MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE
WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO, AND THE STEROIDS
SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (Gotham 2007).
14. See Dietary Supplements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science & Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Hearing on Dietary
Supplements], (statement of The Honorable Joe Biden), available at
http://biden.senate.gov/ newsroom/ details.cfm?id=214163.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
16. Curry, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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This note will discuss one way Congress may address the problem of
performance-enhancing drug usage in professional sports. The note
will first examine the definition of steroids and the history of prior
steroid legislation. Next, the note will look at MLB's struggle to adopt
a meaningful drug policy, and will contrast MLB's efforts with those of
the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Next, the note will
discuss Congress' authority in professional sports, and will examine the
legislation regulating the performance-enhancing drug usage in
professional sports. Finally, the note will analyze how Congress can
address performance-enhancing drug usage in professional sports. The
note will conclude that Congress should impose forced arbitration
upon professional sports leagues and unions in the event that collective
bargaining does not result in a drug testing agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What are Steroids?
Anabolic steroids are synthetic drugs designed to emulate the
naturally-occurring male hormone testosterone.' 9 Although steroids
are often prescribed by medical professionals to treat problems such as
"loss of function of testicles, breast cancer, low red blood cell count,
delayed puberty and debilitated states resulting from surgery or
sickness,"20 anabolic steroids are also illegally used without a
prescription." Frequently, steroids are used illegally to improve
athletic performance or physical appearance. 2  Anabolic steroids cause
these results because they act as "synthetic forms of androgens, the
male sex hormone produced in the testicles, which increase the
metabolism, stimulate protein production, and contribute to the
growth of skeletal muscle and male sexual characteristics. ,23
These physical gains, however, are not without negative side effects
24
which include both physiological and psychological damage. Major
physiological side effects include live tumors and cancer, jaundice,
fluid retention, high blood pressure, increases in low-density
19. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
ANABOLIC STEROIDS - HIDDEN DANGERS (2004), available at http://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ pubs/brochures/steroids/hidden/index.html.
20. Id.
21. Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789,
4851-54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
22. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 379-81.
23. Id. at 379.
24. Id.
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lipoprotein (LDL or bad cholesterol), and decreases in high-density
lipoprotein (HDL or good cholesterol). 2  Dangerous psychological
side effects include extreme mood swings with manic-like symptoms
leading to violence and depression, as well as "paranoid jealousy,
extreme irritability, delusions, and impaired judgment stemming from
feelings of invincibility.,
26
Abuse of anabolic steroids also may cause gender specific side
effects.27 Men may experience "shrinking of the testicles, reduced
sperm count, infertility, baldness, development of breasts, and
increased risk for prostate cancer., 28 Women may experience "growth
of facial hair, male-pattern baldness, changes in or cessation of the
menstrual cycle, enlargement of the clitoris, and deepening of the
voice., 29 For adolescents, use of anabolic steroids can cause a halt in
growth and accelerated puberty change creating a risk that adolescents
will remain short for the rest of their lives.3°
B. Past Legislation
In an effort to curb steroid use and prevent its negative side effects,
Congress began passing legislation targeting steroids beginning with
the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990.3' The Anabolic Steroid
Control Act added anabolic steroids to Schedule III of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA).32 In the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990,
25. The National Institute on Drug Abuse, InfoFacts - Steroids (Anabolic-
Androgenic) (2005), http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/Infofacts/Steroids05.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Allan H. "Bud" Selig and Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The Regulation of
Nutritional Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 35,
37 (2004). Bud Selig is the commissioner of Major League Baseball. Id. at 35. See
also Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789,
4851-54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
32. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
The Controlled Substances Act attempted to address drug abuse in the United
States. Selig and Manfred, supra note 31, at 37. The Controlled Substances Act
"'established five schedules of controlled substances' ... and placed medications
and drugs onto those schedules based on a sliding scale of three factors: potential
for abuse, accepted medical utility, and safety of use under medical supervision."
Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)-(b) (2000)).
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Congress defined anabolic steroids as: "any drug or hormonal
substance, chemically and pharmacologically related to testosterone.,
33
Although the CSA includes immediate precursors, drugs "which the
Attorney General has found to be . . . an immediate chemical
intermediary used or likely to be in the manufacture of such controlled
substance," as controlled substances,34 a loophole enabled supplement
manufacturers to legally market steroid precursors because they did
not fall within "the current definition of 'immediate precursor' under
the CSA."3  Steroid precursors are not considered immediate
precursors because they are "derivatives of testosterone that
metabolize into anabolic steroids once ingested. 3 6  Nevertheless,
although these steroid precursors remained legal, they had a similar
function to anabolic steroids.37
In 1994, Congress facilitated easier access to performance-enhancing
drugs by passing the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of
1994 (DSHEA), which broadened the definition of dietary
supplements.3 8 DSHEA made it difficult for the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to regulate nutritional supplements,3 9 because
the broad definition of dietary supplements allowed many steroid• 40
precursors to be sold over-the-counter, free from regulation.
33. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 802(41)(A) (2000).
34. Anabolic Steroid Control Act, § 802(6). Immediate precursors are defined
in full as a substance:
A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by regulation
designated as being the principal compound used, or produced primarily
for use, in the manufacture of a controlled substance;
(B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used
in the manufacture of such controlled substance; and
(C) the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the
manufacture of such controlled substance.
Anabolic Steroid Control Act, § 802(23)(A)-(C).
35. Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 37-38.
36. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 378.
37. Id. at 392.
38. Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 41. See also Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
39. Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 41.
40. Scott Danaher, Drug Abuse in Major League Baseball: A Look at Drug
Testing in the Past, in the Present, and Steps for the Future, 14 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 305, 307 n.15 (2004) (citing Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, §3, 108 Stat. 4325, 4327 (codified as
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Moreover, before regulation, the FDA has the burden of proving that
the dietary supplement in question is adulterated,4' which is a very high
burden to meet.4' Therefore, the FDA primarily is only able to
regulate dietary supplements after they have been marketed and sold.43
Consumers, subsequently, are able to purchase and use unsafe dietary
supplements free from FDA regulation.44
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1)(2000))). DSHEA defined dietary supplement
as:
[A] product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that
bears or contains one ore more of the following dietary ingredients:
a vitamin;
a mineral;
an herb or other botanical;
an amino acid;
a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by
increasing the total dietary intake; or
a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination of any
ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
Id.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (f)(1) (2000).
42. § 342 (f)(1). To show that a dietary supplement was adulterated, the FDA
had to show that it:
A) presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury under--
(i) conditions of use recommended or suggested in labeling, or
(ii) if no conditions of use are suggested or recommended in the
labeling, under ordinary conditions of use;
(B) is a new dietary ingredient for which there is inadequate information
to provide reasonable assurance that such ingredient does not present a
significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury;
(C) the Secretary declares to pose an imminent hazard to public health or
safety, except that the authority to make such declaration shall not be
delegated and the Secretary shall promptly after such a declaration
initiate a proceeding in accordance with sections 554 and 556 of title 5,
United States Code, to affirm or withdraw the declaration; or
(D) is or contains a dietary ingredient that renders it adulterated under
paragraph (a)(1) under the conditions of use recommended or suggested
in the labeling of such dietary supplement.
Id.
43. See Hearing on Dietary Supplements, supra note 14 (testimony of John M.
Taylor).
44. Id. (testimony of Charles Bell)(highlighting how Ephedra, a dangerous
dietary supplement, went marketed for years before being regulated by the FDA).
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Realizing the danger of these loopholes, Congress finally made some
progress by passing the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004.4' The
Act "equated androstenedione to anabolic steroids and added sixty
substances, including THG, to the list of Schedule III drugs., 46 The
Act also provided funding to public and private entities "to carry out
science-based education programs in elementary and secondary
schools to highlight the harmful effects of anabolic steroids.,
47
Nevertheless, the Act did not define some steroid precursors, such as
dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA), as anabolic steroids.48
III. APPROACHES TO THE PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING DRUGS
PROBLEM IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Although MLB's new agreement received Congressional approval, it
took time and effort to come to that accord.4 ' An examination of
MLB's efforts to adopt a meaningful drug agreement personifies the
struggle professional sports leagues must endure where there is a
collective bargaining requirement.50 In contrast, an examination of the
drug policy of the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
exemplifies one of the most respected testing systems.51
45. See Wilairat, supra note 8, at 387-88. See also Anabolic Steroid Control
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 Stat. 1661 (2004) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C.A. § 801, 802 et seq., 811(g); 28 U.S.C.A. 994; and, 42 U.S.C.A. 290bb-25f,
290aa-4 (West Supp. 2004)); Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 43.
46. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 391.
47. 42 U.S.C.S. § 290bb-25f (West Supp. 2004).
48. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 391. See id., for the view that the Anabolic
Steroids Control Act did not go far enough because it excluded DHEA.
49. See Shaun Assael & Peter Keating, Who Knew? ESPN: THE MAGAZINE,
Nov. 21, 2005, at 78-79 (timeline entitled Will to Power), 81-82.
50. See Danaher, supra note 40; Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 48-57
(discussing how sports leagues have failed to establish meaningful regulations).
51. Steroids Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Steroids Legislation]
(statement of The Honorable John McCain), available at http://
commerce.senate.gov/ hearings/ testimony.cfm?id=1619&wit-id=4691). The IOC
drug policy has often been acclaimed as "the gold standard" for steroid testing and
regulations. Id.
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A. Steroid Testing in MLB
1. The Collective Bargaining Requirement for MLB
A reason often cited by doping experts to explain the discrepancy
between the drug policies of MLB and the IOC is that MLB "must
collectively bargain [with the MLBPA] over the terms of any drug
policy prior to implementation."52  The MLBPA, although "not
formally a union under the National Labor Relations Act," negotiated
a collective bargaining agreement in 1968."3 The following year, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decided that professional
baseball was subject to the NLRA.54 As such, the NLRA requires the
MLB and the MLBPA to negotiate "in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 55 The
NLRB has consistently found that drug policies are required topics of
bargaining, "requiring good faith negotiations with the union prior to
implementation.",6
This collective bargaining requirement is an obstacle to a more
stringent drug policy. Players associations will undoubtedly resist
implementation of broad drug policies because drug testing can lead to
intrusion of privacy, fines, and suspensions.57 Thus, depending on the
strength of the union, the collective bargaining requirement can serve
as a significant impediment to instituting a meaningful drug policy.
58
2. A Brief History of Collective Bargaining in MLB
Although Congress only began holding hearings on performance-
enhancing drugs in professional sports after 2000, the problem began,
particularly with MLB, well before then. 9 In the summer of 1998,
baseball players Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa chased, and
eventually exceeded, Roger Maris' single season homerun record of 61
52. Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 48.
53. Danaher, supra note 40, at 316.
54. Id. (citing The American League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B.
190 (1969)).
55. Selig & Manfred, supra note 31, at 48 (quoting NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,348-49 (1958)).
56. Selig and Manfred, supra note 31, at 48 (citing Johnson-Bateman Co., 295
N.L.R.B. 180, 182-83 (1989)).
57. Selig and Manfred, supra note 31, at 35.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 70.
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that had lasted since 1961. 60 During this time, McGwire admitted to
using androstenedione (andro), which is now an illegal precursor to
testosterone.6 1 Although andro was neither illegal nor restricted by the
rules of baseball at the time, andro had already been banned by the
National Football League (NFL), the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), and the IOC.62 Just three years later, in 2001,
Barry Bonds set a new single season homerun record after hitting 73
homeruns.63 Veiled beneath these record breaking seasons was the
concern that the success could be attributed to illegal performance-
enhancing drugs.64
While MLB was concerned by these allegations, few steps were
taken to address them.6' From 1997 to 2002, MLB and the MLBPA
had a collective bargaining agreement that restricted MLB from
66
making any significant changes. Meanwhile, steroids were banned by
MLB but were not the subject of testing.6 MLB Commissioner Bud
Selig was able, however, to unilaterally institute steroid testing in
Minor League Baseball, uninhibited by a collective bargaining
requirement.
6s
In 2002, at the expiration of the labor agreement, MLB and the
MLBPA negotiated a new drug policy that, for the first time, called for
steroid testing.69 Due to the pressures of collective bargaining, the new
drug policy was not as tough as MLB had hoped . It fell short of
expectations in that the plan: only called for forewarned testing during
the baseball season, did not add andro or amphetamines to the banned
substances list, and provided only negligible penalties for drug
60. Murray Chass, McGwire's Grand Finale Makes it 70, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1998, at Al. Mark McGwire held the new single season homerun record, hitting 70
homeruns. Id.
61. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 77.
62. Id. Andro has since been made illegal by Congress. Wilairat, supra note 8,
at 391.
63. Hermosa, supra note 11.
64. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 81.
65. Id. at 80.
66. See id. at 78, 82.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 81.
69. Id. at 82.
70. Hearing on Steroid Use, supra note 7 (statement of Allan H. Selig). For an
examination of the difficult negotiation between MLB and MLBPA, see Bryant,
supra note 5, at 256-260.
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offenses.71 The MLBPA, however, agreed that if five percent or more
of players tested positive for steroids in 2003, the League would
institute random drug testing the following season. 2 Not surprisingly,
the requisite five percent of players had tested positive to steroids, and
random steroid testing commenced in 2004."3
Around this time, the BALCO scandal began making headlines,
and Congress demanded the adoption of a tougher drug policy. 4 The
MLBPA, led by Executive Director Donald Fehr, opposed any
changes to the then active collective bargaining agreement.75
Nevertheless, in January 2005, in response to much criticism, MLB and
the MLBPA amended the existing drug testing agreement adding
tougher guidelines.7 ' The new drug policy created stricter punishment,
added steroid precursors, masking agents, and diuretics to the banned
substances list, and provided for additional testing throughout the
season and off-season.77 Although the drug testing agreement was
more severe than any plan in the past, questions still remained about
78its effectiveness. The policy was criticized for not adding
amphetamines to the banned substances list79 and for having too
lenient of a punishment regime.80
In March 2005, the House Committee on Government Reform held
a full hearing where MLB officials and MLB players (including Sammy
Sosa, Mark McGwire, Jose Canseco, Rafael Palmeiro, Frank Thomas,
71. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 82. A first positive test did not result
in a suspension, a second positive test only resulted in a suspension of 15 days, and
a third suspension only resulted in a suspension of one year. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 83.
74. Hearing on Steroid Use, supra note 7 (statement of The Honorable John
McCain).
75. Id. (statement of Donald M. Fehr).
76. Hal Bodley, Baseball Officials Announce Tougher Steroids Policy, USA
TODAY, Jan. 16, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2005-
01-12-steroid-policy-x.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). For the full drug agreement
see Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program (2005),
http://news.findlaw.com/ usatoday/docs/sports/mlbdrugpolicy05.pdf.
77. Bodley, supra note 76.
78. Id. See also Wendt, supra note 10, at 11.
79. Bodley, supra note 76.
80. Bryant, supra note 5, at 394-95. When Congress subpoenaed the drug
agreement, the body discovered that the supposedly mandatory ten-day
suspension for a first offense was in fact optional, at the discretion of the
commissioner. Id.
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and Curt Schilling) testified.8' The House Committee criticized MLB's
drug testing policy, and questioned some of the most renowned power
hitters in baseball about their alleged drug use. In September 2005, the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology held a
hearing on Steroids Legislation. Senator John McCain reinforced
criticism that he had previously offered, and assured MLB that if the
League did not agree to a tougher drug policy, he would push
legislation that would complete this goal.n2 Because Bud Selig
supported a new drug testing agreement during the hearing, most of
the criticism fell upon Donald Fehr.83
Facing the threat of Congressional legislation, the MLBPA finally
relented on November 15, 2005, and agreed to a new drug policy,
despite being in the middle of an existing collective bargaining
agreementi 4 This new joint drug testing agreement calls for stricter
penalties, more frequent testing, and an expanded banned substances
list, including amphetamines.85  The agreement has appeased
Congressional demands for the present." The new agreement,
however, does not preclude Congress from addressing future issues.
B. Steroid Testing by the IOC
An examination of the IOC's drug policy adoption provides a stark
contrast to MLB's experience, and shows what is possible without the
requirement of collective bargaining. In 1999, the IOC created the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) "to promote and coordinate the
fight against doping in sport internationally. '"8' In 2003, WADA
81. Full Committee Hearing of Restoring Faith in America's Pastime before H.
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Restoring
Faith]. At this hearing, Rafael Palmeiro emphatically denied ever taking steroids,
but Palmeiro later tested positive for steroids, placing even greater pressure on
MLB. Bill Pennigton, Baseball Bars Longtime Star for Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2005, at Al.
82. Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51 (statement of The
Honorable John McCain).
83. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 84.
84. Curry, supra note 2.
85. Id. The agreement calls for a fifty game suspension for a first positive
steroid test, a one hundred game suspension for a second positive steroid test, and
a lifetime ban for a third positive steroid test. Id. The agreement also calls for
both off-season testing and random testing. Id.
86. Id.
87. World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, http:// www.wada-ama.org/
en/ dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=253.
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created the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code), a uniform set of
anti-doping rulesi8 Although it took time to finalize the code, 9 the
end result of the program provides an explanation for the adoption
hardship. The Code was adopted unanimously by 1200 delegates
representing 80 governments, the IOC, the International Paralympic
Committee (IPC), all Olympic sports, national Olympic and
Paralympic committees, athletes, national anti-doping organizations,
and international agencies.90
The Code has been praised for its severe punishment regime, broad
banned substances list, and frequent and independent testing
requirements. 91 The Code provides an immediate two-year ban after
one offense and a lifetime ban for a subsequent offense. 92 While the
Code does not state explicitly the number of tests given each year, it
does state that an "effective number of In-Competition and Out-of-
Competition tests should be administered," and provides that advance
notice testing is imperative. Finally, adopters of the Code commit to
independent testing in conformity with the guidelines set forth in the
International Standard for Testing.94 This testing policy has been called
the gold standard for drug testing, and it inspired Congress when it
drafted performance-enhancing drug legislation.9
It should be noted that testing for steroids and other performance-
enhancing drugs is becoming increasingly difficult, regardless of the
steroid policy. 96 The BALCO scandal highlighted the difficulty of
88. World Anti-Doping Agency, What is the Code- Introduction,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=267.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51, (statement of The
Honorable John McCain). For the complete text of the code, see World Anti-
Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code (2003), http://www.wada-ama.org/
rtecontent/ document/code-v3.pdf [hereinafter World Anti-Doping Code].
92. Id. at 27. See also Wendt, supra note 10, at 11.
93. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 88, at 19.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51 (statement of Sen. John
McCain).
96. See Full Committee Hearing on S. 529/U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 529] (statement of Dr. Don H. Catlin, M.D.),
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=151 1&witid=4278.
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"designer steroid" detection. 97 THG is just one of many designer
steroids that are currently being produced and marketed secretly."
Moreover, Human Growth Hormones, a banned performance-
enhancing drug that is virtually undetectable in urine tests, are
becoming increasingly prevalent.99  In order for detection to be
effective, there must be agencies like the USADA that receive
government funding and are committed to researching and detecting
designer steroids."'°
IV. POTENTIAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
Congress has authority to regulate professional sports through the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.1"
Under this clause, Congress has the power to "regulate commerce...
among the several states.'.. 2 With respect to professional sports, the
Supreme Court has noted explicitly that Baseball and other
professional sports leagues operate in interstate commerce.103
Congress is thus able to regulate professional sports leagues as it would
any other industry engaged in interstate commerce.
Concerned over usage of performance-enhancing drugs in
professional sports, Congress used its authority to draft legislation
addressing the problem. There were a number of proposals from both
parties in the Senate and the House. Any statutory enactment would
have likely resulted in litigation.104
97. Id. (statement of Terry Madden, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency).
98. See id. (statement of Dr. Don H. Catlin, M.D.),
99. Jeff Passan, Baseball's HGH Problem, Yahoo! Sports, June 7, 2006,
http://sports.yahoo.comlmlb/news?slug=jp-hgh060706&prov=yhoo&type=lgns.
MLB recognized the seriousness of the HGH problem when former MLB pitcher
Jason Grimsley admitted to using HGH alleged that many other MLB players
have used HGH as well. Id. "Natural HGH is produced by the pituitary gland to
stimulate normal development and growth." Another Kind of Juice Threatens
Sports, CBS, June 11, 2006, http:// www.cbsnews.com/ stories/ 2006/ 06/ 11/
eveningnews/ main1699713.shtml. Players use synthetic HGH "to increase muscle,
shed fat and speed recuperation." Id.
100. See Hearing on S. 529, supra note 96 (statement of Dr. Don H. Catlin,
M.D.).
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
104. See Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51 (statement of Donald
M. Fehr, discussing potential Constitutional issues of the proposed legislation).
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A. The Proposed Legislation
In November 2005, just before MLB's new drug testing agreement,
there were a number of bills under consideration. In the Senate, two
main bills were being considered: the Integrity in Professional Sports
Act' °5 and the Clean Sports Act of 2005.'06 In the House, a number of
bills were also introduced, including: the Drug Free Sports Act,0 7 the
Professional Sports Responsibility Act of 2005,08 and the Professional
Sports Integrity Act of 2005.'09
Although the exact details of each bill varied, the prevailing
sentiment indicated that Congress desired professional sports drug
policies that included more frequent and random testing, more drugs
on the banned substances list, and more severe penalties for positive
tests. Some of the bills were inspired by IOC standards. For example,
both bills in the Senate and the Professional Sports Integrity Act of
2005 in the House included provisions adopting the penalty regime of
the World Anti-Doping Code, directing leagues to issue a two-year
suspension after a first positive testing, and a lifetime ban after another
positive testing."0
Ultimately, all of the bills were shelved after MLB and the MLBPA
came to an agreement."' Senator John McCain of Arizona gave the
League an ultimatum: that MLB and the MLBPA agree to a tougher
drug policy or Congress would pass legislation setting the standards for
the League."2 Congress's pressure was a big reason as to why MLB
and the MLBPA came to an agreement."
13
B. Constitutional Issues
During the Senate Commerce Committee's hearing on proposed
steroid legislation, Donald Fehr indicated any proposed legislation that
105. Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005).
106. Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
107. Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
108. Professional Sports Responsibility Act of 2005, H.R. 3942, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005).
109. Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.
2005).
110. S. 1334, §6(d)(1); S. 1114, §4(b)(7)(A); H.R. 2516, §4(b)(6).
111. Curry, supra note 2.
112. Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51, (statement of The
Honorable John McCain).
113. Curry, supra note 2.
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passed would be challenged in court.14 This challenge would most
likely arise under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution,"5 which
protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures." 1'6
In order to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable, the
Supreme Court balances the extent of the intrusion upon the
individual against the promotion of a legitimate government interest. 
17
Thus, a court would be forced to balance the government's interest in
controlling drug usage against the intrusion into players' Fourth
Amendment rights."8  Such a case would raise many novel
Constitutional issues, and the outcome is thus contentious.
V. ANALYSIS
Although Congress has now postponed any attempts to pass
legislation directed at performance-enhancing drugs in professional
sports, the issue has not disappeared. First, MLB's drug agreement is
in its early stages, and the results of the testing program may not satisfy
Congress' demands.1 9 Second, Congress remains dissatisfied with the
drug policies of the National Hockey League (NHL) and the National
Basketball Association (NBA), which means that Congress could
again broach the issue of performance-enhancing drugs in professional
114. Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51, (statement of Donald M.
Fehr). Fehr stated that, "given the doubt that any such legislation would be
Constitutionally valid, along with the evidence that the agreement reached by the
parties in collective bargaining is successfully dealing with the problem, legislation
at this time is not warranted." Id. at 11.
115. Charles V. Dale, Federally Mandated Radom Drug Testing in Professional
Athletics: Constitutional Issues, CRS Report for Congress, May 9, 2005. Although
challenges to drug tests have also been brought under the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment, these challenges would likely fail. Id. at 2 (fn 2).
116. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
117. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)(citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
118. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
119. See Curry, supra note 2.
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sports. 2 0  Third, while the higher risk of testing positive due to
increased testing will dissuade some athletes from using steroids,
undoubtedly some will continue to seek them. Finally, MLB has yet to
approach the topic of how to appropriately test players for HGH use.12 1
Congress could deal with each problem as it arises, but a better
approach is to find long-term solutions that would allow Professional
Sports Leagues to adapt to evolving and unexpected issues. One
method that can curb performance-enhancing drug usage is to require
arbitration in the event that leagues and players' associations are
unable to agree on a drug policy.
There are a number of reasons why it is prudent for Congress to take
this approach. First, Congress has a legitimate interest in a national
problem that the collective bargaining process has not addressed
adequately. Second, the suggested approach avoids many of the
hardships that would have arisen from the passage of any of the recent
Congressional proposals. Finally, the suggested approach addresses
the performance-enhancing drug problem in professional sports while
simultaneously granting leagues and players autonomy over the
regulations that will impact them.
A. Congress Has Legitimate Reasons to Intervene
1. Steroid Use in Professional Sports is a Problem
Many criticized Congress' efforts as it attempted to address steroid
use in professional sports. 2 Some suggested that Congress was
grandstanding on this issue to gain publicity.123 Others complained that
Congress should not be spending time on this issue when larger
problems loom. 12 4 Regardless of Congress' intentions in addressing the
issue, steroid use remains a national problem. Steroid use by
professional athletes is unethical and illegal, causes health hazards,
25
and, as professional athletes are role models, promotes further use and
126
sale. Because professional sports leagues have been unable to
120. Kathy Kiely, Focus on NBA, BHL to Improve Drug-testing Policies, USA
TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005.
121. Passan, supra note 99.
122. Murray Chass, Congress Blows Smoke and Ignores Real Killers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at D4.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 379.
126. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 383-84; see also Veronia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S.
at 663.
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successfully discourage steroid use, Congress has sufficient reason to
take action.
a. Using Steroids is Immoral and Illegal
Congress has a substantial interest in regulating steroid use on the
sole basis of its illegality.1 7 Moreover, steroid use is against the rules
of the professional sports leagues and as such is cheating. Players who
use steroids do so because they believe it improves their athletic
performance.2  Players, who do not use steroids by following the rules
of the sport, are often left at a disadvantage compared to players that
have increased their strength, gained the ability to train harder, and
gained the ability to recover faster.
The disadvantage caused by steroid use encourages non-using
players to take steroids to remain competitive. 9 This creates "an
atmosphere of coercion where clean athletes, who do not want to take
drugs, feel compelled to do so to succeed.' 130  As former National
League MVP and the late, admitted steroid user Ken Caminiti once
said, "I can't say, 'Don't do it,' not when the guy next to you is as big as
a house and he's going to take your job.' 131 While those who use
steroids in fear of losing their job should not be exonerated, some
usage would be avoided absent such pressure.
Finally, if sports leagues are aware of drug use in their sport, and
continue to call their sport clean without taking correcting measures,
they are selling a fraudulent product to consumers, fans, and
spectators. Congress has a legitimate concern regarding a billion-
dollar industry taking advantage of consumers.
b. Steroids Cause Health Risks
Congress also has a legitimate concern over the health hazards of
steroid use. As mentioned earlier, these hazards include both
psychological and physiological effects. 112 This has resulted in morefrequent and new kinds of injuries. Baseball managers and trainers
127. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
128. See Wilairat, supra note 8, at 379-81.
129. Hearing on Steroid Use, supra note 7, (statement of Terry Madden).
130. Id. Terry Madden serves as the Chief Executive Officer of the United
State Anti-Doping Agency. Id.
131. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 82.
132. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 379.
133. Tom Verducci, The Injury Toll. Steroid Use May Explain a Sharp Rise in
the Time Players Spend on the Disabled List, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002,
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noticed injuries such as muscle and ligament tears that generally
resemble those from contact sports.T3
Steroids also can result in serious psychological problems."' During
March 2005, the House Committee on Government Reform heard
testimony from parents whose children committed suicide due to
depression resulting from steroid use.'36 This testimony has been cited
as one of the reasons for Congress' and MLB's and MLBPA's
137
response.
c. Professional Athletes Function as Role Models
Another reason for Congress' intervention in professional sports is
due to professional athletes' position as role models."3 The Supreme
Court has recognized that professional athletes serve as role models to
children, and has found that athletes' use of performance-enhancing
drugs can influence others, especially teenagers, to do the same.'39 One
significant example of this phenomenon is that in the year after Mark
McGwire's announcement of his andro usage, sales of the substance
skyrocketed 1,000 percent, creating $50 million in profits. 140
Perhaps more shocking are survey results, conducted by Blue Cross
Blue Shield in 2001, which "found that use of steroids and similar
drugs increased by [twenty five] percent from 1999 to 2000 among boys
ages 12 to 17.''4' Another national survey done for federal drug
agencies found that nearly half a million teenagers have used
steroids. 142  Teenagers often use performance-enhancing drugs toemulate their athletic role models. 43 This teenage use translates into
at 44, available at http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ si online/ special-report/ news/
2002/ 05/28/ verducci/.
134. Id.
135. The National Institute on Drug Abuse, InfoFacts - Steroids (Anabolic-
Androgenic) (2005), http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/Infofacts/Steroids05.pdf.
136. Hearing on Restoring Faith, supra note 81 (statement of Dr. Denise and
Raymond Garibaldi). See also Statement of Mr. Donald M. Hooton available at
http://www.businessofbaseball.com/steroidhearings/HootonTestimony.pdf.
137. George Vecsey, A Tragedy that Echoes After a Life Burns Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005.
138. Veronia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 663.
139. Id.
140. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 79.
141. Timothy Egan, Body-Conscious Boys Adopt Athletes' Taste for Steroids,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at Al.
142. Id.
143. Wilairat, supra note 8, at 383-84.
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physical dangers.1" One way Congress can address these physical
dangers is by assuring that sports leagues take serious steps in stopping
its players from drug use.
2. Collective Bargaining Has Not Addressed The Problem
Adequately
Not only is the use of performance-enhancing drugs a problem, but
the history of the development of MLB's drug policy reveals that
collective bargaining has not addressed the problem adequately.
Although MLB suspected illegal performance-enhancing drug use, few
steps were taken to curb it.14' From 1997 to 2002, MLB and the
MLBPA had a collective bargaining agreement which did not provide
for drug testing. 46 Although this partially reflects the League's lack of
seriousness regarding the steroid problem, it also reflects the difficulty
encountered by MLB during the collective bargaining process. Indeed,
during this same time, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig unilaterally
instituted steroid testing in Minor League Baseball where he was not
restricted by collective bargaining requirements. 7
In 2002, when the labor agreement expired, MLB and the MLBPA
negotiated a new drug policy, which for the first time called for steroid
testing. 14" However, due to the pressure of collective bargaining, the
new drug policy was not as tough as MLB had hoped.14 Nevertheless,
this drug policy continued until the BALCO scandal made headlines,
at which point Congress demanded MLB adopt a tougher drug
policy. 50 Even with Congress' intense pressure, the MLBPA initially
remained insubordinate to any changes to the existing drug policy.'
5
'
Although this was a partial reflection of the MLBPA's desire to hold
off negotiations until the existing collective bargaining agreement
expired, it also reflected that the MLBPA found the existing drug
policy sufficient.
52
144. Id.
145. Assael and Keating, supra note 49, at 70.
146. Id. at 78-79.
147. Id. at 81.
148. Id. at 82.
149. Hearing on Steroid Use, supra note 7 (statement of Allan H. Selig).
150. Hearing on Steroid Use, supra note 7 (statement of The Honorable John
McCain).
151. Id. (statement of Donald M. Fehr).
152. Id. (statement of Donald M. Fehr).
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Congressional intervention and pressure was the necessary impetus
for a meaningful drug policy.153 The collective bargaining process was
not addressing adequately the problem of performance-enhancing
drugs in professional sports, and it therefore was necessary for
Congress to intervene.
B. Congress' Proposed Legislation Would Result In A Number Of
Difficulties
Congress' proposed legislation, ultimately, should be praised for
putting pressure on MLB and the MLBPA to agree on a new drug
policy. Despite this progress, however, the passage of this legislation
would result in a number of problematic issues.
Any legislation that imposed drug testing requirements on sports
leagues quite likely would be challenged in court. 154 Such litigation
would raised complex Constitutional questions; the legislation even
could be struck down and declared unconstitutional. 155 Regardless of
the outcome of the litigation, the government would be forced to
participate in the costly matter.
In addition to the financial hardship of litigation, the legislation
would require Congress to regulate many different sports leagues - a
role in which Congress lacks expertise. Each sports league has its own
organization, including rules, regulations, and season structure. In
addition, some of the proposed bills fail to consider the resources that
will have to be redirected from other important matters to regulate
professional sports. Although placing pressure on sports leagues to
implement more stringent drug policies is a worthy goal, direct
regulation by Congress is an inappropriate means to achieve this
result.
C. An Alternative Solution: Congress Should Require Arbitration For
Sports Leagues In The Event That Collective Bargaining Does Not
Result In A Drug Testing Agreement
A better method to curb the use of performance-enhancing drugs by
professional athletes is to impose arbitration on sports leagues and
players associations if they are unable to reach a drug testing
agreement otherwise. This requirement probably will yield more
153. Curry supra note 2.
154. Hearing on Steroids Legislation, supra note 51 (statement of Donald M.
Fehr). Fehr hinted at this in the hearing. Id. at 11.
155. Murray Chass, Steroid Tests Ignore the 4th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2005, at D2.
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stringent drug policies for sports leagues, while still granting the
leagues and the players autonomy over an issue with which they have
greater familiarity.
Arbitration often is used by state governments in disputes with
public employees such as policemen and firemen.1 16 For example, in
New York, the law requires that state policemen enter binding
arbitration if they are unable to resolve disputes over compensation
157issues . The rationale for such a policy is "to promote harmonious
and cooperative relationships between government and its employees
and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and
uninterrupted operations and functions of government.'
158
A similar rationale exists in the context of professional sports.
Future strike-threats by players have caused sports leagues to concede
to drug policies that insufficiently deter performance-enhancing drug
use. If arbitration were required in the event of an impasse, sports
leagues could propose meaningful drug policies without fear of an
ensuing strike due to players' objections. Arbitration thus would cause
players associations to make reasonable proposals in fear that
unreasonable proposals would make the arbitrator side with the
league.
Also, an arbitration policy would give both the players and the
leagues increased voice in league governance. The NLRA states that it
is "the policy of the United States to eliminate the cause of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce[,] and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
15
1
Forced arbitration is in accord with this policy. Although, in
compulsory arbitration, one of the parties might be ultimately
dissatisfied with an arbitrator's decision, their deliberations at least
would be taken into consideration prior to a drug policy
implementation. Most importantly, arbitration would give governing
power to those with expertise and familiarity of the sport.
VI. CONCLUSION
The attention of sports fans has recently been averted from sports to
steroids. To address this problem, Congress should require arbitration
in professional sports in the event that sports leagues and players
156. See Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, NY CLS Civ S § 209 (2005).
157. Id.
158. See Public Employee's Fair Employment Act, NY CLS Civ S § 200 (2007).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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associations cannot come to a drug policy agreement. This solution,
however, is not the only means of Congressionally inspired progress.
Other ideas have been suggested, including increased funding for
research of steroids and increased punishment for producers or
distributors of illegal performance-enhancing drugs. Regardless of the
method chosen, the ultimate goal should be to revitalize the era of
sports spectatorship and enjoyment for the athletic performance, and
not the drug use.
